Operation Sindoor Exposed Limits of Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrence, US Report Says

Pakistan’s experience during the May 2025 military confrontation with India has exposed what a US-based nuclear security organisation described as significant limitations in Islamabad’s nuclear deterrence strategy. According to an assessment by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal did not prevent the crisis from developing, deter Indian strikes deep inside Pakistani territory or provide Islamabad with a clear advantage once hostilities began. The report argued that the conflict highlighted a difficult reality for Pakistan’s strategic establishment: nuclear weapons may have a narrower role in preventing or managing conventional military confrontations than previously claimed.

Conventional Military Power Gains Prominence

The assessment also pointed to a shift in Pakistan’s security narrative, with conventional military capabilities receiving greater prominence while the country’s nuclear arsenal appeared less central to public messaging. It noted that Pakistan’s commemorations of the May 2025 conflict received greater attention than the anniversary of its 1998 nuclear tests. 

Public displays in Islamabad reportedly focused heavily on conventional military achievements, battlefield successes and military leadership, while nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles were less visible. The report linked this shift partly to the Pakistani military’s domestic political interests, arguing that conventional military successes provide a more visible means of demonstrating power and reinforcing the armed forces’ public standing.

Questions Over ‘Full-Spectrum Deterrence’

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists also questioned Pakistan’s long-standing doctrine of “full-spectrum deterrence.” It argued that the May 2025 confrontation demonstrated a gap between the claims made about nuclear deterrence and what nuclear weapons could actually accomplish during a military crisis. During Operation Sindoor, India carried out strikes against terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, followed by further strikes amid the subsequent military escalation. The report said the confrontation showed that the existence of nuclear weapons did not necessarily prevent conventional attacks or escalation.

Nuclear Weapons Also Created Additional Risks

The report further argued that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could itself complicate crisis management. With both sides possessing nuclear capabilities, conventional missile launches could potentially be misinterpreted, increasing the danger of unintended escalation. It also referred to reports that Pakistan’s National Command Authority may have been convened, or was preparing to meet, during the final phase of the confrontation. The assessment said the emergence of nuclear command-and-control issues in public discourse illustrated how narrow the margin for error had become.

The report concluded that Pakistan’s experience does not necessarily invalidate nuclear deterrence theory altogether. However, it cautioned against treating nuclear weapons as a universal solution to security challenges, arguing that countries seeking nuclear capabilities should also consider the risks and military constraints that such arsenals can create.