Islamabad, Dec 29 (AHN) Pakistan's ties with Afghanistan has deteriorated and reached to a lowest point in years due to constant recriminations, recurrent border skirmishes and a growing sense of strategic frustration in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir recent warning to Taliban that Kabul must choose between its ties with Pakistan and its alleged support for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) showcases Islamabad's failing Afghan policy, a report has stated.

"The statement, delivered at the National Ulema Conference in Islamabad with religious leaders of every persuasion in attendance, was remarkable not merely for its content but for what it revealed about Pakistan’s failing Afghan policy. Rarely has a Pakistani military chief addressed the Taliban in Kabul with such open coercion," author and columnist Arun Anand wrote in a report in newspaper Blitz.

"The warning, which is essentially an ultimatum, signalled that Pakistan’s long-standing strategy of influencing Kabul through ideological affinity, diplomatic engagement, occasional cross-border strikes and increased deportation of Afghan refugees has run aground. Having failed to secure compliance from Afghan Taliban through these measures, Pakistan appears to have now started resorting to threats afresh with concurrence of religious leadership which otherwise maintain ties with their counterparts in Afghanistan," he added.

Munir's warning to Taliban was framed as a matter of national security. He said that Pakistan could not tolerate the continued presence of TTP fighters in Afghanistan. His statement was a reiteration of Pakistan's recent messaging that Taliban's continued ties with the TTP would come at the cost of its goodwill. However, ultimatum rarely indicate strength in diplomacy and are often seen as admissions of failure, according to the report.

A report in Blitz said, "For more than three years since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul, Pakistan has attempted, through back-channel talks, intelligence coordination, religious mediation and cross-border military strikes to pressurise the Afghan leadership to curb TTP’s activities across the Durand Line. These persuasive and coercive measures have produced little as the Afghan Taliban have recurrently rebuffed Pakistani claims of TTP’s presence inside its borders. Instead, they have insisted that the issue is Pakistan’s internal problem and hence be not dragged in this fight against those with whom they share ideological roots."

Asim Munir’s warning to Taliban demonstrates that Pakistan no longer thinks it can influence Afghanistan through familiarity or patronage. Notably, Pakistan once considered Taliban's return in Afghanistan as a strategic triumph and Islamabad was among Taliban’s most enthusiastic supporters during the 20 years of the US-led war in Afghanistan. After Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in 2021, many in Pakistan’s military establishment saw vindication.

In a report in Blitz, Arun Anand wrote, "The expectation was straightforward: a friendly regime in Kabul would provide Pakistan with 'strategic depth,' limit India’s influence in Afghanistan and cooperate closely on security matters, including suppressing anti-Pakistan militant groups. But that assumption was deeply flawed. The Taliban of 2021 which returned triumphant to Kabul was not the Taliban of 1996."

"They returned to power not as an isolated militia but as rulers seeking international legitimacy, economic survival and regional balance. Far from acting as a Pakistani client, the new Taliban leadership set out to assert Afghanistan’s autonomy by cultivating relations with China, Iran, Russia and even India, while refusing to subordinate its security decisions to Pakistani demands," he added.